SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2007 Edition

 

 

LOCAL communities dependent on agriculture have in the past year and a half come out in vehement opposition to the acquisition of land for Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Examples abound from Nandigram in West Bengal to Raigad in Maharashtra, Jhajjhar in Haryana and Nandagudi in Karnataka. The SEZ policy is the government’s most recent tool to spur economic growth. At present there are 360 formally approved SEZs. These will cover an area of 583 sq km (58,300 hectares). Combined with the in-principle approvals, the total land requirement is expected to be as much as 1,945 sq km (194,500 ha). The Ministry of Commerce points out that this is only 0.065 per cent of India’s total land mass.

We make the assumption that an average land holding size might be 1.3 hectare. This means that land for SEZs could be directly supporting some 150,000 families or 600,000 people. Around 1.3 ha per family is higher than the 1.06 ha NSSO has reported as the average national land holding size in 2002-03 but then not all land acquired will be farm land. How can we hope to compensate 600,000 people for the loss of their land and, at the same time, ensure new sources of livelihoods for them? Do we have estimates of how many agricultural labourers, traders or even fishermen accessed resources or earned an income because of this land? Given this reality, we can see that millions of people are at risk. The SEZs will create a much smaller number of industrial jobs which will be appropriated by educated, urban people.

In the absence of a strong national rehabilitation policy, land acquisition for industrial and ‘development’ projects using the Land Acquisition Act 1894, has led to the displacement of millions and been a key issue of concern since independence. Movements in the late 1980s brought this question to the fore, demanding the withdrawal of or amendment to the Land Acquisition Act (LAA), which gives the power of ‘eminent domain’ to the state to acquire any land for ‘public purpose’. All states saw a wave of land acquisitions with the formation of Industrial Development Corporations (IDCs) in the 1960s and 1970s and later in the 1990s. IDCs acquired land from farmers using the LAA and created small industrial parks or belts. Most of this land was strategically located near cities, ports or areas where infrastructure was available or could be easily built up and strengthened.

The land was mostly fertile, agricultural land (irrigated and non-irrigated), and wasteland (mostly grazing or scrub forests). As more industries were being set up in non–IDC areas, the LAA continued to be used for acquisition with the government aiding big and small companies. If we look at figures from Gujarat, for instance, more than 50 per cent of the land acquired by the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC) has been lying unused. With the announcement of the SEZ policy this land is now being handed over entirely to private developers or in partnership. The government is now talking about direct purchase of land by corporate houses more so after land acquisition for SEZs came under the scanner. The UPA government has repeatedly announced that state governmentsshould stay out of the acquisition process and that if land is directly purchased then the farmer has the right to say ‘no’. A new rehabilitation policy and possible amendments in the LAA formalising this arrangement are likely to be announced soon.

So how would this translate on the ground? How does a company deal with the farmer? The farmer ‘interface’ would vary from state to state and from region to region. In India, 'farmer' is not a term representing a homogenous category. The current experience indicates that companies are operating through a chain of dalals or agents, typically found among upper caste, big landowners. While thesedalals can make large sums of money selling their own land, they also have the resources to obtain land from smaller farmers and take care of opposition to land sales in return for contracts, perks, jobs and commissions from the company. Further, it is rare to find companies with comprehensive rehabilitation packages. It is cash compensation that corporate enterprises prefer to minimise liabilities and recurring costs. If money or jobs for land are not accepted by smaller landowners, the question is what will happen when the state has retreated?

A recent meeting of farmers opposing land acquisition for a Reliance SEZ in Jhajjar near Gurgaon in Haryana was cut short by a loud gang of pro-SEZ youth. This is just a glimpse of goonda rule and use of methods outside the rule of law to curb opposition. This process is especially widespread in states that have seen faster economic growth and a collapsing agricultural sector. Some prominent examples are Dholera, Dahej, Pipavav in Gujarat; Nagpur, Pune and other areas in Maharashtra, Punjab and Haryana. In these regions, movements against SEZs have been mainly for better compensation. The courts have been approached and protests have intensified. And so companies have hiked land rates, almost three to four times. Most SEZs are close to cities and rely on good transport routes. This proximity boosts their real estate value. So, while the reasons for setting up SEZs is to promote industrial activity, the reality is the SEZ will always be profitable for a developer since the land can be used for real estate if no industry ever comes up. For instance, in Gurgaon land prices are as high as Rs 2 crore per acre. Reliance knows that land prices will increase and its investment in the Jhajjar SEZ is a safe bet.

The real losers are those who have very little land, the marginal farmers, those who work as agricultural labourers or depend on fishing, livestock rearing and other related occupations in a rural economy. These people, who comprise as much as 50 to 70 per cent of thepopulation in a village, mostly belong to backward and deprived castes. They receive little or no compensation for the loss of their livelihood and are reduced to becoming labourers in nearby towns and cities. They will find it very difficult to make ends meet. Since contiguous lands are required for large SEZ areas, some farmers are first bought off by the company and those with little land are ultimately forced to sell, even if they don’t want to. There are also examples of farmers in Punjab and Haryana who prefer to sell their land and buy fertile, cheap land in Chhattisgarh. In places around Nagpur in Maharashtra, factors like the lack of irrigation facilities and indebtedness are driving distress sales. Then there are areas in the central-eastern belt of India and parts of the south and even Western Maharashtra which are resisting land acquisition by the government or by companies. Most of these regions practise subsistence agriculture. Rural societies here are tribal/non tribal and fairly cohesive. Subsistence agriculture is practised and land ismore evenly distributed among the community.

Some of these areas have a history of resistance to mining and other industrial projects. And it is here that industrialists are finding themselves paralysed for SEZ related acquisitions. Such situations have seen extreme polarisation and emergence of violent clashes. The state has resorted to violence and backhanded tactics to suppress or dissipate movements resisting industry. Where panchayatsare strong with some semblance of collective decision making, the government has come down heavily, curbing and overlooking gram sabha powers and resolutions. In villages where aspirations of the landed class are strong, political parties and companies are running panchayats on money and power. Many areas are struggling somewhere in between these two situations. The upshot is that it is becoming difficult for the poor to access democratic institutions to hold on to their livelihoods. Legislation is needed on rehabilitation and acquisition of land that recognises the sovereignty and protects the rights of farmers and other rural communities. Minimising or avoiding displacement with fair, informed and prior consent before acquisition is essential to ensure the rule of law and just development. But even with the best policies and laws we need a government that does not side with the industrialists and economically powerful urban and local classes against the poor. We need local decision-making and local accountable mechanisms not only for all projects which require land acquisition but also for the social and environmental impacts. More than ever, the government needs to be made accountable, not to private companies, but to poor, land-based communities.

This report was done with Patrik Oskarsson who is doing his PHD at the School of Developmental Studies, UK. Manshi Asher is an independant researcher.

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